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 ABSTRACT  
 
The Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism has been 
widely used in international treaty-making and invoked many times in 
cross-border dispute resolution.  ISDS is a system where a foreign investor 
can bring claims against a host state for its discriminatory acts upon the 
investor.  As China pursues a new level of outbound investment in the last 
decade, the ISDS mechanism will apply particularly in the context of 
investment disputes involving Chinese investors and foreign countries.  
This note will examine the evolution of ISDS clauses in China’s Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs), especially with the European Union (EU), as 
well as these clauses’ implications for Chinese investors seeking remedies 
under the ISDS clauses.  It will start by exploring the context in which the 
discussion of ISDS arises and some of the main criticisms raised against 
ISDS clauses in recent years.  It will then assess ISDS clauses in China’s 
BITs and some challenges when consolidating different versions of ISDS 
provision, followed by a case study of arbitration between Chinese 
investors and Belgium.  When seeking to challenge a state’s action that 
violates an investor’s rights and interests, ISDS provides limited remedial 
protection to investors and presents disadvantages to Chinese investors 
that the Chinese government should be aware of while drafting BITs with 
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the EU.  In its ongoing and future treaty negotiations, China should 
provide a clear-lined arbitral scope, limit uncertainties in its treaty 
language, and install mechanisms to remedy the lack of transparency in the 
ISDS system, all while taking into account the importance of its state 
interests. 
 




Historically, a foreign investor has two ways to seek a remedy when 
the host state interferes with an investment: either through a local court or 
administrative body in the host state or through espousal of a claim of 
diplomatic protection from the investor’s home country.  Neither channel is 
perfect, and in many occasions both have been ineffective in redressing 
investors’ problems.1  By contrast, ISDS provides a fair opportunity for 
foreign investors to challenge state actions.  
ISDS is widely used in many international treaties and investment 
agreements.  It is a mechanism for settlement between investors and host 
states for disputes arising from state actions that affords both parties fair 
hearings before a neutral, impartial tribunal.2  ISDS serves as a more 
flexible settlement device and affords readily enforceable remedies to 
private parties in international investment disputes.3  Both parties have 
control, to some extent, over the dispute resolution process.  For 
arbitrations administered by the International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), parties have the freedom to choose among 
arbitrators provided by ICSID.4  
Because of an emerging need for a neutral forum for investor-state 
cases, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States established ICSID in 1966.5  ICSID is 
 
 1. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD), Investor-
State Dispute Settlement UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
II (United Nations 2014), 23. 
 2. Id. at 13. 
 3. Id.  
 4. See The ICSID Caseload Statistics (Issue 2017-2), ICSID Website, https://icsid. 
worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English) 
%20Final.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) (more than 70% of arbitrators were selected by the 
parties). 
 5. About ICSID, ICSID Website, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default. 
aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). 
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considered to be an independent and depoliticized institution for 
international investment dispute settlement.6  Some other popular forums 
designated by International Investment Agreements (IIAs) and BITs other 
than domestic courts or administrative bodies and domestic arbitration 
committees include the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC).  
More than half of ICSID cases involve BITs that give rise to ICSID 
jurisdiction.7  Some standard provisions that are central to the ISDS clauses 
include consent to arbitration, available arbitration forums, and the types of 
investor-state claims covered by ICSID.8  Most respondents in ISDS cases 
consist of developing countries, while there is also an increasing trend of 
cases being brought against developed countries.9 
In essence, ISDS provisions in BITs provide a tool that states can use 
to guarantee remedies for investors if any dispute arises.  There are two 
major approaches in constructing the ISDS clause in treaties.  The 
traditional approach essentially allows the tribunal to review a broad range 
of ISDS claims.10  The other approach exhibits a recent development which 
limits the scope of ISDS claims with the goal of affording a more 
predictable and effective process for parties involved.11  As explored 
further below, this difference has fueled problems of inconsistent 
interpretations of ISDS provisions.   
 
B. Criticisms of ISDS 
 
1. Difficult in conforming to the volatility in state policy  
 
During the past few decades, ISDS has been widely criticized for its 
institutional deficiencies.  Since many investors have brought claims 
against states’ public policies, a factor that is often unpredictable before the 
investments take place, ISDS cannot conform to the changing nature of 
public policy in host states.12  Relatedly, volatility in the economic and 
political environment, such as the financial crisis of 2008 create additional 
problems.  For example, in Ping An v. Belgium (more detailed discussion in 
 
 6. Id.  
 7. Supra note 4. 
 8. Id. at 30. 
 9. Id. at 1920. 
 10. Supra note 1, at 16. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Supra note 1, at 13. 
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Section III below), due to the financial crisis, the Belgian government 
executed a state rescue plan tantamount to an expropriation that cost Ping 
An Insurance a large portion of its investment in Belgium.13  The 
unpredictability of the market, among so other factors, may drastically 
change a state’s standing on a certain policy, and is often hard to foresee by 
foreign investors.  
 
2. Lack of predictability and coherence in decisions  
 
Unlike judicial decisions, arbitral awards are usually confidential.  
Sometimes  international arbitral awards are decided only on jurisdictional 
grounds and not on the merits of the case.14  The awards are occasionally 
found to be inconsistent with the judgments in previous awards due to 
different or even contradicting interpretations of treaty provisions, which 
ultimately lead to difficulty in predicting ongoing and future cases.15  
Different tribunals interpret the same treaty language or similar facts 
differently.16  There is also an increasing trend of structuring investments 
under multiple investment treaties and forum shopping, which creates more 
likelihood for inconsistent decisions.17  
This lack of consistency unavoidably impacts the credibility of the 
arbitral tribunals, and lead parties to question the effectiveness and fairness 
of the ISDS mechanism.  However, investors can challenge the award 
according to the ICSID Convention through the annulment process.18 19  
But non-ICSID awards, such as those under the New York Convention, do 
 
 13. Ping An Life Insurance Company of China Ltd. and Ping An Insurance (Group) 
Company of China Ltd. v. Kingdom of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29, Award 
(2015). 
 14. See ICSID Convention art. 41(2): “Any objection by a party to the dispute that that 
dispute is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre, or for other reasons is not within the 
competence of the Tribunal, shall be considered by the Tribunal which shall determine 
whether to deal with it as a preliminary question or to join it to the merits of the dispute.” 
 15. Supra note 1, at 27. 
 16. S. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1545–46 
(2005).  
 17. Id. at 1546.  
 18. Id. at 1547.  
 19. ICSID Convention art. 52(1): upon receipt of party’s request, an ad hoc committee 
of three persons may fully or partially annul an award on the basis of one of more of the 
following grounds: a) the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) the Tribunal manifestly 
exceeded its powers; (c) there was corruption on the part of a Tribunal member; (d) there 
was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) the award failed to 
state the reasons on which it is based. 
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not allow an annulment procedure, and an investor may be left to seek a 
court order to set aside or vacate the award.20 
Furthermore, there is no immediate remedy to cure an ill-decided 
award or an inefficient appellate mechanism.21  Even though claimants 
sometimes can ask a court to convert the arbitral award into a formal 
judgment, many courts, especially in the U.S., are often deferential to the 
arbitral tribunal.  Therefore, some have argued for an institutional reform of 
the arbitration system that incorporates either an internal review and 
guidance system, or an appellate system.22  However, both proposals cast 
doubts on the difficulty of designing and implementing such systems, and 
whether they would accommodate the variances and complexities from 
different treaties. 
 
3. Lack of transparency in judgment-making and selecting tribunal 
members  
 
So far, 64 percent of the ICSID cases were decided by arbitral 
tribunals, while the remaining cases were settled or discontinued.23  Many 
arbitrations are performed on an ad hoc basis, and arbitrators are sometimes 
questioned for the sufficiency of their knowledge and experience.  Some 
criticize tribunals for their expansion of its arbitration jurisdiction when 
interpreting treaty clauses.24  When facing erroneous decisions or an 
annulment, many cases are not subject to appellate review.  The only 
remedy left for investors then is to bring another action.  
In addition, not all awards are made public, and many proceedings are 
confidential unless parties agree to waive confidentiality.25  Because many 
investor-State disputes involve public welfare and public interest, private 
arbitral proceedings has raised concerns over lack of transparency, and has 
been one of the main criticisms against the ISDS system.26  Therefore, 
publication of awards might be one way to facilitate a more transparent 
 
 20. Id. at 1549-50.  
 21. G. Kaufmann-Kohler & M. Potestà, Can the Mauritius Convention serve as a model 
for the reform of investor-State arbitration in connection with the introduction for a 
permanent investment tribunal or an appeal mechanism? CIDS – Geneva Center for 
International Dispute Settlement, ¶ 22 (June 3, 2016), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/ 
english/CIDS_Research_Paper_Mauritius.pdf. 
 22. Supra note 15, at 1601.  
 23. Supra note 1. 
 24. U. Grušic, The Evolving Jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, J. WORLD INVE. & TRADE, vol. 10, no. 1, 100 (Feb. 2009). 
 25. Supra note 1, at 13–14. 
 26. Supra note 19. 
 
266 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
 266
arbitral processing system and provide a legal framework which the public 
perceives as more reliable and consistent.   
 Another issue involving arbitral tribunals lies in their appointment 
procedure.  The appointment of arbitrators is questioned largely for its lack 
of impartiality in the appointing process.27 ICSID arbitrators are subject to 
ethical rules; nevertheless, there has been an increasing amount of 
challenges to their impartiality and ability.28  Critics note a rising concern 
over conflicts of interest, as some arbitrators are repeatedly appointed as 
tribunal members, and at the same time hired as counsels for related parties 
in other proceedings.29   
 
4. Relative difficulties faced by small enterprises and individual 
investors  
 
Small- and medium-sized companies and individuals accounted for 
half of the class brought under international arbitrations.30  Some scholars 
who researched ISDS cases, however, found that the average cost of each 
case is more than USD 8 million per party, and can exceed USD 30 
million.31  This figure is an enormous barrier to bringing claims for small- 
and medium-sized companies and individuals.  For host states, it is also a 
huge expense that must somehow come from government budgets and 
therefore burdens small, developing countries.  Some cases are not only 
expensive but take a long time before the arbitral tribunals render an award.  
Meanwhile, foreign investors from outside certain economic regions 
might face even greater challenges to bringing actions against states.  For 
example, an investor from the U.S. might have fewer advantages than an 
investor from Germany if suing France.  In fact, according to a report by 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), EU 
countries who have been sued recently in investor-State claims more often 
than in the past.32  In 2013 and 2014, forty-two percent and twenty-five 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Supra note 1, at 27–28. 
 29. S. Schacherer, Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators: A Rule of Law 
Analysis, Jan. 2018, https://deicl.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/i_deicl/VR/VR_Per 
sonal/Reinisch/Internetpublikationen/Schacherer.pdf. 
 30. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet: Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) (Mar. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds. 
 31. D. Gaukrodger & K. Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper 
for the Investment Policy Community, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 
2012/03 (OECD Publishing 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en.  
 32. European Commission, Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Some Facts and 
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percent of the total new disputes were brought against EU countries, 
respectively, while fifty-six percent of the total new disputes were brought 
by European investors.33 
Despite these criticisms, ISDS predominates most of China’s modern 
BITs.  China’s increasing appearances in investor-State arbitration are one 
of the results of implementing ISDS provision in its BIT.34  The next 
section will examine the development of China’s BITs and its adoptions of 
ISDS provisions of both the European model as well as American model.   
 
II. ISDS Provisions in BITS that China has Concluded 
 
A. Evolution of Chinese BITs  
 
Among the BITs and Treaties with Investment Provisions (TIPs) that 
China concluded, 129 BITs and 19 TIPs are currently in force.35  The first 
generation of Chinese IIAs and BITs were very restrictive and signed 
mostly with developed European countries.  The ISDS provisions in these 
early treaties only covered disputes regarding the amount of compensation 
in the event of expropriation.36  During most of the 1990s, China continued 
this practice and entered into more agreements with developing countries.  
In 1998, China concluded an investment treaty with Barbados, which 
included a broader ISDS clause allowing investors to submit “any dispute” 
with host states to international arbitration.37  Thereafter, China started to 
include more liberal ISDS provisions that give more weight to international 
arbitration and some now-common ISDS standards such as national 
treatments.38,39  With its expanding outbound and inbound investment 
 
Figures, 6-7, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153046.pdf. 
 33. Id. 
 34. D. Pathirana, A Look into China’s Slowly Increasing Appearance in ISDS Cases. 
Investment Treaty News (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/09/26/a-look-into-
chinas-slowly-increasing-appearance-in-isds-cases-dilini-pathirana/#_edn4. 
 35. See International Investment Agreements Navigator, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#footnote (last visited Feb. 19, 
2018). 
 36. A. Berger, China’s Recent Approach to International Investment Rule-Making, 16 J. 
World INVE. & TRADE 843, 845-48 (2015). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 849.  
 39. See e.g., Sino-UK BIT art. 3(3): “either Contracting Party shall to the extent 
possible, accord treatment in accordance with the stipulations of its laws and regulations to 
the investments of national or companies of the other Contracting Party the same as that 
accorded to its own nationals or companies.” 
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policies in recent years, China started to develop more comprehensive 
ISDS provisions in BIT negotiations.  In its negotiations with the U.S. and 
the EU, China continues to adopt this broader and more balanced 
investment treaty provision.40 
Since 2007, when the first arbitration claim was brought by a Chinese 
investor against a host state,41 there have been six cases filed before the 
ICSID, two of which have concluded.42  Only one case is against an EU 
country.43  Chinese investors started to employ the ISDS provisions as an 
alternative to litigation in the last decade.  With the increasing amount of 
investments between China and EU countries, Chinese investors are more 
likely to continue using ISDS provisions to protect their interests.   
 
B. Comparison of China’s Current Treaties   
 
 1. BITs Based on the European Model 
 
China has concluded BITs with 26 EU member states.44  China and 
the EU launched their negotiation rounds for BIT (EU-China BIT) in 2013, 
and started their thirteenth round of negotiation in 2017.45  The new EU-
China BIT, when concluded, will replace all the current BITs between 
China and EU countries.  The ISDS provision in the EU-China BIT will 
likely adopt some part of the ISDS provisions from current BITs between 
China and EU member states.  
The Ministry of Commerce of China drafted a model BIT in 2010 and 
drew heavily from the traditional European model.46  For example, Article 
15 of the 2010 model BIT stipulates that this agreement applies to “all 
investment made before and after this agreement comes into force,” but 
does not apply to “disputes arising before this agreement comes into 
force.”47  This is similar to Article 10.2 in China’s BIT with Belgium in 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. See generally, Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6. 
 42. See id., and Ping An v. Belgium, supra note 13.  
 43. See Ping An v. Belgium, supra note 13.  
 44. How to Understand the China-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiation, Institute 
of European Studies of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, August 21, 2017. 
 45. China, EU starts 13th Round of BIT Negotiations, Xinhua Net, http://www. 
xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/16/c_136288358.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
 46. J. Xiao, How can a prospective China-EU BIT contribute to sustainable investment: 
in light of the UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, J. 
WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. (2015) 8 (6) 521. 
 47. This Model BIT was not officially published, but discussed by X. Wen in 
Discussion on “China Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (draft)” (Part Three). 19(2) Guo 
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2009, which stated that the Agreement applies to “all investment made… 
before or after the entry into force of this Agreement,” but not to disputes 
or claims “concerning an investment which was already under judicial or 
arbitral process before its entry into force.”48 
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
between the EU and Canada is one of the most recent trade agreements that 
the EU concluded after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 
2009.  CETA’s investment section contains some of the most commonly-
used clauses of the European model, including national treatment, fair and 
equitable treatment, full protection and security, expropriation, and free 
transfers.  The most reformative aspect of CETA is the EU and Canada’s 
joint advocacy of a multilateral investment court to replace the ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals.49  CETA also initiated some innovative ISDS features in 
an effort to increase transparency of the ISDS system, and to strengthen 
trust in arbitrators’ credentials and experiences.50  
The China-Canada BIT concluded in 2012 and is considered to be the 
most comprehensive BIT China has signed.51  It has set out new procedures 
and rules for ISDS.52  CETA and China-Canada BIT share many 
commonalities which the EU-China BIT may include, such as the 
requirement of expertise in public international law for arbitrators and a 
waiver clause to prevent parallel proceedings.53  
 
 2. BITs Based on the U.S. Model 
 
Other than the popular European model, China has also been 
consistently adopting provisions from the U.S. model in an effort to restrict 
arbitration.  This rather strict feature can be traced back to those early BITs 
 
Ji Jing Ji Fa Xue Kan (2011), http://www.chinesejiel.com/upFj/中国投资保护协定范本（
三）.doc (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
 48. Agreement between the Government of the People′s Republic of China and the 
Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, P.R.C-B.L.E.U, art. 10.2, June 6, 2005 (came into force on Jan. 12, 2009). 
 49. A. Roberts, The Shifting Landscape of Investor-State Arbitration: Loyalists, 
Reformists, Revolutionaries and Undecideds, EJIL: Talk June 15, 2017, https://www.ejiltalk 
.org/the-shifting-landscape-of-investor-state-arbitration-loyalists-reformists-revolutionaries-
and-undecideds (last visited March 20, 2018). 
 50. R. García-Gallardo & X. Jin, The E.U.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty. China 
Law Insight, http://cn.swisscham.org/sites/default/files/The%20E.U.%20-%20China%20Bil 
ateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf (last visited March 20, 2018). 
 51. Supra note 41. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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that China concluded, and was due largely to China’s role as an Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) importing country, positioning itself as a state that 
avoids cross-border investment disputes.54  The U.S. has adopted a more 
defined and restricted ISDS model in its agreements with other countries.55  
The China-Colombia BIT was adopted after the U.S. model and 
implemented many mechanisms to restrain a tribunal’s jurisdiction in some 
areas, such as essential security.56  It excluded arbitral tribunal jurisdiction 
on disputes arising from the most favored nation treatment.57  It also 
required investors, who claim expropriation arising from taxes, to first 
exhaust their remedies with the host state’s tax department and let the state 
government decide whether the taxation amounts to expropriation.58  
Indeed, China’s investment treaties in the last decade have largely 
adopted the American model.  In addition to the China-Colombia BIT, the 
China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (FTA) completely adopted the 
fair and equitable treatment from the U.S. BIT Model of 2004, and the 
China-Mexico BIT completely borrowed the fair and equitable treatment 
from the U.S. BIT Model of 2004.59  For example, both China and the U.S. 
require four conditions—due process, non-discrimination, public interest, 
and effective compensation—to render expropriation. 60  
In conclusion, the ISDS provisions in CETA, the China-Canada BIT, 
and China’s model BIT of 2010 will likely be used as blueprints for the 
EU-China BIT that is currently undergoing negotiation.  The recent BITs 
with large influence from the American models also indicate that China is 
moving toward the American model regarding investment protection and 
dispute settlement.61  China has shown willingness to adopt parts of the 
 
 54. Axel Berger, China’s New Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme: Substance, 
Rational and Implications for International Investment (Nov. 2008), 910, https://www.die-
gdi.de/uploads/media/Berger_ChineseBITs.pdf. 
 55. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet: Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) (Mar. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds. 
 56. A. Irwin, Crossing the Ocean by Feeling for the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in 
China’s Bilateral Investment Treaty, GEGI Working Paper (May 2014), 24, https://www.bu. 
edu/pardeeschool/files/2014/11/China’s-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Working-Paper.pdf. 
 57. Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the 
Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China, art. 3(3). 
 58. Id. art. 14(5). 
 59. C. Cai, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty Regime: A 
Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, J. INT’L ECON. LAW, Volume 12, 
Issue 2 (June 2009), 468–69. 
 60. Id. at 475.   
 61. Id. at 485-86.   
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American Model BIT of 2012, including intellectual property rights, and 
labor and environment protection.62  Since China is negotiating BITs with 
the EU and the U.S. at the same time, this may be the time for China to 
consolidate conflicting provisions between the American model and the 
European model from the past.  The experiences of Chinese investors with 
ISDS to date can help guide this consolidation process as well as other 
issues that will be explored below.  
 
III.  Main ISDS cases brought by Chinese investors 
 
One of the most complicated cases brought by Chinese investors is 
Ping An v. Belgium.  The case was decided in 2015, but the dispute started 
during the 2008 financial crisis.  Ping An Life Insurance Company of 
China Ltd. and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Ltd. 
(collectively “Ping An”) acquired approximately 4.81 percent of the Fortis 
Group from 2007 to 2008, which was worth more than two billion Euros, 
and was given the right to appoint a director on the Board.63  The crisis in 
the international banking system gave rise to a liquidity problem for 
Fortis.64  Eventually, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, acquired 
100 percent, 100 percent, and 51 percent of Fortis and its subsidiaries in 
each country, respectively.65  As a result, Ping An’s share of Fortis was 
expropriated without any compensation.66  
In 2005, China and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union 
concluded a new BIT,67 effective in 2009 and replacing the BIT of 1986.68  
The 1986 BIT provided that “[a]ll disputes relating to investment” should 
be notified to the host state by the investor, and the investor has the option 
to either submit to domestic court in the host state or to international 
arbitration when there are “disputes relating to the amount of compensation 
payable in case of expropriation, nationalization or any other measures 
 
 62. L. Yong & D. Yan, 中美双边投资协定谈判：制度因素、核心条款与应对策略 
(China-US BIT Negotiations: Institutional Factors, Core Clauses and Coping Strategies), 
CASS-IWEP Working Paper No. 201314, Institute of World Economy and Politics, Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences.  
 63. Supra note 13.  
 64. Id. ¶¶ 58-59.  
 65. Id. ¶¶ 60-64.  
 66. Id. ¶ 62.  
 67. Agreement between the Government of the People′s Republic of China and the 
Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, P.R.C-B.L.E.U, art. 10.2, June 6, 2005 (came into force on Jan. 12, 2009). 
 68. Id. art. 10. 
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similarly affecting investments.”69  The 1986 BIT will remain in force for 
ten years from its expiration date with respect to investments made before 
the expiration date.70  
Under the 2009 BIT, investors can submit to the ICSID for any “legal 
dispute” arising between an investor and the host state.71  The 2009 BIT 
applies to all investments made before and after the 2009 BIT’s entry into 
force, but the 1986 BIT does not govern any dispute or claim concerning 
“an investment which was already under judicial or arbitral process before 
the 2009 BIT’s entry into force.72  
The Ping An dispute arose from the interpretation of the 2009 BIT—
that is, whether it can be interpreted in an expansive way such that it covers 
disputes which breached the 1986 BIT.73  Ping An based its claim on the 
1986 BIT, but based its jurisdictional argument on the 2009 BIT.74  In its 
objections to jurisdiction, Belgium argued, inter alia, that the tribunal 
lacked jurisdiction ratione temporis because the dispute arose before the 
2009 BIT entered into force on December 1, 2009.  But, according to the 
Article 8 of the 2009 BIT, the jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited to 
disputes after December 1, 2009.75  
In accepting this argument, the arbitral tribunal reasoned that the plain 
meaning of the 2009 BIT only refers to disputes arising after the 2009 BIT 
comes into force.76  The tribunal further pointed out that since Ping An had 
already notified the Belgian government that Ping An would take action 
based on the 1986 BIT, the dispute arose before the 2009 BIT came into 
force, and was therefore not covered by the 2009 BIT.77  This resembles the 
narrow approach of the dispute settlement clause of the BIT between China 
and Mongolia in a 2017 ICSID case, where the tribunal found restrictive 
jurisdiction to any “dispute involving the amount of compensation resulting 
from an expropriation.”78  There, the tribunal concluded that even though 
the 2009 BIT made clear its intention to replace the 1986 BIT, it does not 
 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. art. 14.  
 71. Id. art. 8.  
 72. Id. art. 10.  
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 75. Id. ¶ 113.  
 76. Id. ¶ 224.  
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render the tribunal with jurisdiction over disputes that had been notified but 
not taken into judicial or arbitral proceedings under the 1986 BIT.79  The 
tribunal refused to take an expansive approach partly due to the concern of 
over-broadening the range of disputes of a similar nature.80   
Both tribunals in the Ping An case and the Mongolia case mentioned 
above took a more restrictive approach, which is far from the approach 
taken in the Tza Yap Shum case.81  In Tza Yap Shum, the first ISDS case 
brought by a Chinese investor, the claimant challenged the government of 
Peru for its action that allegedly amounted to expropriation.82  The tribunal 
interpreted the wording of “expropriation” to include inherent 
expropriation, because to conclude otherwise would undermine the 
arbitration clause.83  The tribunal sided with the tribunals in previous cases 
that took broad interpretations of “expropriation,” despite the fact that the 
tribunal in Tza Yap Shum took into consideration China’s favoritism toward 
a narrow interpretation of the clause during its negotiations with Peru.84  
This approach is followed by another ISDS case brought by a Chinese 
investor against the government of Laos, in which the tribunal broadly 
interpreted the dispute settlement clause.85 
In summary, an examination of ICSID cases with Chinese complaints 
demonstrates the impact of inconsistent interpretations of ISDS provisions 
in China’s BITs.  The next section further explores other restrictions and 
insufficiencies of current ISDS provisions in affording Chinese investors 
meaningful remedies against foreign state actions.  
 
IV. Limitations of ISDS Provisions in Practice 
 
A. Vagueness and Inconsistency among different BITs and IIAs 
 
In many earlier BITs and IIAs that China concluded, the provisions 
largely varied because their designs were driven by the preferences of the 
other signee.86  From the Chinese investors’ perspective, they are equipped 
with vague and sometimes overbroad ISDS provisions to challenge host 
 
 79. See supra note 13, ¶228. 
 80. Supra note 13, ¶230.  
 81. Supra note 33. 
 82. See Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, supra note 36, and Ping An v. 
Belgium, supra note 13. 
 83. Supra note 75. 
 84. See Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, supra note 36. 
 85. Supra note 75. 
 86. Supra note 32, at 868.  
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countries in the international arbitration forums.  Even though there have 
been only six cases filed with ICSID, and only two of them concluded, 
there will likely be an increasing trend of ICSID cases filed by Chinese 
investors in the near future.87  For example, the China Railway 
Construction Corporation Limited (CRCC) announced in December of 
2017 that it is planning to bring the government of Mexico to arbitration for 
cancelling CRCC’s successful tender in USD $4 billion worth of high-
speed railway project in Mexico. 
While the early BITs took a restrictive approach to ISDS provisions, 
in a few cases brought by Chinese investors the arbitral tribunals adopted a 
rather broad interpretation when deciding the jurisdiction issue.88  The 
Mexico-China BIT provided that expropriation, either direct or indirect, 
may be compensated.89  Under its arbitration provision, an investor may 
submit a claim to arbitration that is due to breach of obligation set forth in 
Chapter II of the BIT and as a result causes damages to the investor.90  
The “fair and equitable treatment” standard is adopted commonly in 
ISDS provisions, but also controversial because of its elastic and constantly 
shifting meaning.91  It has been invoked in almost all of the ISDS cases.92  
Since 2008, China has been cautiously reforming the “fair and equitable 
treatment” standard.  As a result, this standard has been written very 
differently among different treaties that China has concluded, which may 
be the result of different treatments between countries that are partnered 
closely with China and those that are not.93   
 
 87. See Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru (concluded), supra note 36; Ping An v. 
Belgium (concluded), supra note 13; Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. 
Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/20 (pending); 
Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen (pending), ICSID Case 
No. ARB/14/30; Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. United Republic of 
Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/41 (pending); Sanum Investments Ltd. v. Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, ICSID Case No. ADHOC/17/1 (pending). 
 88. See Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, supra note 36; Beijing Urban 
Construction Group Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen, id.; Sanum Investments Ltd. v. Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, id. 
 89. Agreement between the Government of the United Mexican States and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments, art. 7, July 11, 2008 (came into force June 6, 2009). 
 90. Id. art. 13. 
 91. K. Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Developments, 
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) 111. 
 92. See Special Update on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures, p.1, 
Nov. 2017, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf. 
 93. Supra note 32 at 858–59.  
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Similarly, the “indirect expropriation” standard is used frequently 
when investors challenge a broad range of state measures that require the 
arbitral tribunal to interpret expropriation more expansively.94  Chinese 
investors have invoked this standard in a few ISDS cases.95  The most 
recent development of this standard in China’s treaties was adopted after 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which gave more 
consideration to legitimate public purposes, such as public health and 
safety and environment protection.96  However, variance of the “indirect 
expropriation” language still exists among different treaties and agreements 
China has signed with European and countries from the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).97  
The 2010 model BIT drafted by the Ministry of Commerce of China 
(MOFCOM) provided that the fair and equitable treatment standard issues 
arises when investors are “willfully rejected to fair judicial proceedings or 
be treated with obvious discriminatory or arbitrary measures.”98  As 
suggested above, the EU-China BIT will also be influenced heavily by 
treaties signed between the EU and other countries, especially CETA.  
CETA provided an exhaustive list of state acts that would trigger invoking 
the fair and equitable treatment: (i) denial of justice in criminal, civil or 
administrative proceedings; (ii) fundamental breach of due process, 
including a fundamental breach of transparency, in judicial and 
administrative proceedings; (iii) manifest arbitrariness; (iv) targeted 
discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or 
religious belief; (v) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress 
and harassment; or (vi) a breach of any further elements of the fair and 
equitable treatment adopted by the parties’ regular review.99 
CETA and the Canada-China BIT adopted similar measures for the 
indirect expropriation standard by stating that non-discriminatory measures 
protecting legitimate public interests do not constitute indirect 
 
 94. Id. at 859.  
 95. See Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, supra note 36, and Ping An v. 
Belgium, supra note 13. 
 96. Supra note 32. 
 97. Id. at 859–60.  
 98. J. Xiao, How can a prospective China-EU BIT contribute to sustainable investment: 
in light of the UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, 8 J. 
WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 521, 533 (2005). 
 99. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between Canada and the European Union and Its Member States, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ 
agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Feb. 2, 2018). 
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expropriation, as well as providing an illustrative list for such inquiry.100  In 
CETA, the list includes the following: (i) the economic impact of the 
measure—it has to be clarified that the sole fact of the measure having an 
adverse effect on the economic value of an investment in itself does not 
give rise to a finding of indirect expropriation; (ii) the duration of the 
measure; (iii) the extent to which the measure interferes with distinct, 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the 
measure, notably its object, context and intent.101  The Canada-China BIT 
provides a similar criteria.102  
A precisely-tailored ISDS provision with specific and confined 
criteria, as demonstrated in CETA, will provide a clear guide not only to 
investors, but also to arbitration tribunals when interpreting the text.  This 
would also help eliminate the capricious and arbitrary interpretations of the 
arbitrators, and further reduce the volatility in investors’ expectations and 
preventable suits against host states.   
 
B. Incapacities in providing proper remedies 
 
Varying interpretations of treaty language causes lack of consistency 
and uniformity in applying the treaties.  As discussed above, the tribunals 
in the Ping An case interpreted the ISDS clause narrowly, while the 
tribunals in Tza Yap Shum and Sanum cases provided broader 
interpretations.  The divergent results are partly due to different parts of the 
arbitration clauses that were interpreted.  However, having a consolidation 
mechanism for similar claims or claims arising from similar treaty 
provisions would essentially contribute to the coherence of awards, and 
increase the likelihood of affording just remedies.103  
Inadequate remedy amount is yet another obstacle that foreign 
investors have been facing.  In a case study of 462 ICSID cases from 1990 
to 2014, the tribunals awarded only 30 to 40 percent of the petitioners’ 
monetary claims on average.104  This figure was even lower in the Tza Yap 
Shum case, where the tribunal awarded only USD$78,000 compared to the 
loss claimed by petitioner in the amount of USD$25 million.  In only six 
 
 100. Supra, note 92.  
 101. Supra, note 93. 
 102. Canada-China BIT (2012), annex B.10(2). 
 103. Supra note 1, at 6. 
 104. R. Wellhausen, Recent Trends in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, J. INT’L DISP. 
SETTLEMENT, 2016, at 1, 4, 19. 
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out of the 462 cases mentioned earlier were there rewards larger than or 
equal to what the investors sought.105  
Another challenge that foreign investors often deal with in ISDS cases 
is state policies in protecting public interests.  For example, in the China-
Australia FTA, state interests are protected when it is necessary to protect 
human life or health; it is necessary to comply with domestic laws and 
regulations; it is to protect national treasures; and it is relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.106  This type of general 
exception clause is found in many treaties and shields states behind public 
interests.  In Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the challenged anti-smoking 
legislations were aimed at public health but allegedly injured Philip Morris’ 
investment interest in Uruguay.107  Nevertheless, the tribunal found that 
Uruguay adopted a reasonable regulatory measure to promote public 
health.108  Foreign investors may be vulnerable to the volatility of the 
policies of host states, especially in countries where political regimes shift 
constantly or those with an unstable regulatory environment.  
In addition, it is difficult sometimes to enforce the arbitration award 
against states.  Arbitral awards based on ICSID Convention are subject to 
automatic recognition of contracting states, and execution of the awards are 
governed by the laws of the foreign states.109  Even if an investor receives a 
favorable award, it still has to enforce and execute the award against the 
respondent state.  This often creates an additional hurdle for investors.  The 
governments of Argentina, Zimbabwe, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Thailand, and 
Venezuela have repeatedly refused to satisfy awards entered against them, 
while the governments of Mexico and Romania have been fighting against 
the enforcement of arbitral awards against them.110  
In some cases where the host states have assets overseas, investors can 
go to the courts in those countries and seek enforcement, pursuant to the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards.  In a recent arbitration between Venezuela and Resort Mining 
Limited, the tribunal found Venezuela violated the Canada-Venezuela BIT 
in its action of expropriating Rusoro’s asset in Venezuela.111  After 
 
 105. Id. at 27. 
 106. China-Australia FTA (entered into force on Dec. 20, 2015), art. 9.8.  
 107. See Philip Morris v. Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 2, ¶¶ 
10-11 (July 8, 2016). 
 108. Id. ¶ 420. 
 109. ICSID Convention, art. 54. 
 110. The Changing Practices of International Law (Tanja Aalberts & Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen eds., Cambridge 2018), 96–97. 
 111. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. 
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Venezuela refused to pay the $1.3 billion award, Rusoro petitioned the U.S. 
District Court of Columbia to convert the award into a court judgment and 
to execute Venezuela’s assets in the U.S., and the court confirmed the 
award.112  As a result, Rusoro is now entitled by American law to discovery 
of Venezuela’s state assets around the world, as well as to enforce the 
award in more than 140 countries that are signatories to the Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.113  Large 
companies with abundant resources like Rusoro can usually pursue 
enforcement of the award by using judicial systems in countries that are 
parties to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, especially in courts like the American ones that are more 
deferential to arbitral awards. 
 
C.  Conflicts between the EU and its member states 
 
Foreign investors in European countries may face another obstacle in 
the attempt to enforce an award, especially when the cited investment 
treaty conflicts with EU laws and regulations.  This results in an increasing 
number of challenges to the compatibility of intra-EU BITs with EU laws 
and regulations.  Since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the EU 
possesses comprehensive exclusive competence over foreign investment.114  
The EU Regulation passed in December 2012 by the European Parliament 
provided that the BITs entered into by member states may still remain in 
force until a BIT between the EU and the same third country enters into 
force.115  This would severely affect investors who want to bring suit 
against EU countries based on pre-establishment BIT.  
According to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),116 the EU is constitutionally 
obligated to comply with its own principles to guide external action 
regarding commercial policy.  This is particularly relevant to events when a 
 
 112. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 300 F. Supp. 3d 137, 145, 
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member state is sued by foreign investors because the state must then take 
action to comply with EU’s investment policy.  The incompatibilities 
between the laws of the EU and a member state arise in several areas, such 
as the free transfer of investment-related funds without any exceptions, the 
admission and the post-establishment treatment of foreign investments, and 
equal treatment of all EU nations.117   
For example, in 2013, the court in Micula v. Romania found that 
Romania had violated the fair and equitable treatment obligation under the 
Sweden-Romania BIT for Romania’s withdrawal of economic incentives, 
despite Romania’s claim that its revocation of the incentive program was to 
comply with EU law requirement on state aid.118  In March 2015, the 
European Commission nevertheless rendered that those incentives are 
illegal state aid under EU law, and therefore enjoined Romania from 
complying with the award of US$250 million rendered in Micula v. 
Romania.119  A decision by an ICSID ad hoc committee was issued in 
February 2016, rejecting Romania’s application to annul the award.  
In Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, the Court of Justice of the EU 
declared that the arbitration clause in the BIT between the Netherlands and 
the then government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was 
incompatible with EU law, namely articles 267 and 344 of the TFEU.120  
There, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) invalidated the applications 
of investor-state arbitration provisions in not just the BIT at issue, but all 
intra-EU BITs because the CJEU found the investor-state arbitration 
provision undermines the autonomy and direct binding effect of EU laws 
on member states.121  This is particularly relevant to the discussion here as 
the EU-China BIT negotiations will face the same issue of inconsistency 
between EU objectives and its member states.122  
The European Parliament announced that the EU-China BIT will be 
based on the best practices drawn from the experiences of its member 
states, while maintaining its own objectives and standards.  A few cases 
involving EU countries raised the concern of the enforceability of arbitral 
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awards involving incompatibilities between EU laws and intra-EU 
treaties.123  There might be an increasing volume of caseloads as a result of 
the EU-China BIT and BITs between China and EU member states.  From 
a pratical point of view, the negotations between China and the EU will 
have to tackle the incompatibility issue of the EU laws and the laws of EU 
member states. 
 
V.  Suggestions for Drafing New BITS from China’s Perspective 
 
A. Confine the Scope of Arbitral Claims 
 
As demonstrated in Ping An v. Belgium, the gap between the 1986 
BIT and the 2009 BIT arose out of different scope of claims.  The 1986 
BIT limited the arbitrable claims to disputes relating to investment, while 
the 2009 BIT expanded to any disputes arising between investors and host 
states.124  The narrow approach in Ping An is however not universal.  In 
another concluded ICSID case brought by Chinese investors, the arbitral 
tribunals took a rather expansive interpretation of the dispute settlement 
clause as discussed above.125 
One way to protect investors in foreign investment disputes is to 
construct the BIT with confined scopes of arbitrability, as tribunals 
construe even slight variations of wording in BITs differently.  Indeed, 
tribunals have been less reluctant in recent years to broaden their 
jurisdiction, even when the dispute settlement clauses are rather 
restrictive.126  Some suggested adopting the CETA model, which limits 
arbitration to breaches of investment protection obligation.127  In the China-
Mexico BIT and China-Colombia BITs, China abridged the arbitral 
tribunal’s space to broadly interpret the BIT by limiting the most favorable 
nation clause and tax dispute procedure.128  Both the EU and China would 
welcome a limited scope of claims, especially with the rising numbers of 
ISDS cases against them in recent years.  This could come from a variety of 
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ways to construct ISDS clause, from restraining investors from bringing 
multiple claims against the host state, to prohibiting tribunals from making 
findings against a host state’s domestic laws.129 
 
B.  Minimize Uncertainties and Inconsistency  
 
Since many BITs and IIAs overlap with their earlier versions, there 
will be an increasing number of disputes where contrasting readings of 
different versions of the treaty would hinder the predictability of 
arbitration.  In Ping An and China Heilongjiang ITCC v. Mongolia,130 both 
tribunals took the restrictive approach toward the dispute settlement clauses 
in the BITs.  For example, the Ping An tribunal pointed out that there was 
nothing in the preamble or common clause that indicated a gap-filling by 
arbitration tribunal.131  As follows, the new treaty should clarify whether 
the status quo in the earlier version of the treaty remains or the new version 
will govern disputes notified under the older treaty.132  Both China and the 
EU strive to provide a stable investment environment with improved legal 
certainties with more specified standards and procedures to follow in the 
event of investor-state disputes. 
Another likely adoption of provisions from existing BITs, such as 
CETA and the Canada-China BIT, will be the consolidation of arbitral 
proceedings.133  They both provided clear and concise rules to avoid 
inconsistent arbitral awards.134  CETA, for example, limited the ability of 
investors to bring parallel proceedings while an investment claim is 
pending in order to limit abuse of process and duplicative proceedings.135  
Article 8.22(g) of CETA provides that an investor may only submit a claim 
if the investor waives its right to initiate any claim or proceeding before a 
tribunal or court under domestic or international law with respect to a 
measure alleged to constitute a breach referred to in its claim. 
 
 
 129. Supra note 45.  
 130. Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award Declining to Exercise Arbitral Jurisdiction & 
Compel Arbitration, Beijing Shougang Mining Inv. Co. Ltd. v. Mongolia, No. 17 CV 7436, 
¶ 451 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017). 
 131. Supra note 36, ¶ 225. 
 132. D. Pathirana. Making an Arbitration Claim under Chinese BITs: Some Inferences 
from Recent ISDS Cases. 5 CHINA. J. COMP. L. 420, 420–31 (2017).  
 133. Supra note 92. 
 134. Id.  
 135. D. Gonzalez & G. Morello, Parallel Proceeding Problems: The Case for Party 
Autonomy (July 5, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/811867/parallel-proceeding-
problems-the-case-for-party-autonomy. 
 
282 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
 282
C.  Improve Transparency with Procedural Safeguards  
 
Given the confidential nature of the system, the arbitrator appointment 
system, and the tendency to award in favor of large multinational 
enterprises, ISDS has remained controversial and has been attacked for its 
lack of transparency.136  Therefore, it is crucial to implement procedural 
safeguards to minimize the risk that comes with lack of transparency.  The 
Mauritius Convention on Transparency, for example, was designed to 
provide an effective mechanism to ensure procedural transparency to 
treaty-based investor-state dispute resolutions.137  The Convention was 
ratified by Canada, Mauritius, and Switzerland, and has been signed by 
nineteen countries including the U.S. and several EU member states.138  
The Mauritius Convention on Transparency references the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency, where the latter applies to all investor-State 
arbitrations regardless of whether the arbitration initiates under 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.139  The UNCITRAL Rules took into 
consideration both the public interest and parties’ interest in resolving 
disputes in a fair and efficient manner.140  In the event of conflict between 
the Rules on Transparency and relevant arbitration rules, the Rules on 
Transparency prevail.141  The Rules on Transparency provide some other 
devices: publication of information of commencement of arbitration 
proceedings and documents such as a statement of claim and defense; 
expert reports and witness statements are also available upon public 
request; exhibits may be made available upon the arbitral tribunal’s 
discretion; and hearings except when it concerns confidential protected 
information.142  Incorporating a procedural guidance like the Mauritius 
Convention and the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency will significantly 
improve transparency in investor-State dispute resolutions, and further the 
goal of using the ISDS mechanism.  
The EU has been on the frontier of reforming the ISDS system in 
response to all of its criticisms discussed in earlier sections.  Similar to the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, CETA has raised a few options for 
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the China-EU BIT.143  In order to improve transparency, all documents 
produced by parties and tribunals, as well as hearings will be open to the 
public.144  The tribunal will consist of members selected from a pre-
determined list of well-recognized arbitrators.145  In addition, there will be 
an appellate system to review awards and grant reversal or annulment.146  
All of those are proper considerations for the EU-China BIT, given China’s 
strong interest in affording a more effective system for its investors.   
 
D.  Balance the Interests Between States and Investors  
 
In the recent decade, China’s BITs and IIAs have been heavily 
adopting NAFTA and other significant European models of international 
treaties.  On the one hand, with its rising economic power, China now has 
more leverage in negotiating a more coherent BIT with provisions that are 
beneficial to Chinese investors.  On the other hand, the Chinese 
government also needs to shield itself from unjustifiable liabilities and 
costs associated with being sued in ISDS cases.147  In many ICSID cases, 
investors had sought to expand states’ liabilities in various forms.  For 
example, in a case brought by the Deutsche Bank AG against the 
government of Sri Lanka, the tribunal based its award only on a hedge 
agreement, which does not have a physical investment in the host state.148  
Investors will continue to use ISDS to challenge state action, and in many 
ways may increase pressure on eroding states’ regulatory schemes and 
public interests.  
In recent years, especially after the initiation of the One Belt and One 
Road Project,149 there is a rising concern about China’s commitment to 
further its trade and investment policy while maintaining its own regulatory 
scheme.  The ongoing BIT negotiations with the U.S. and the EU will 
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inevitably create challenges to China’s treatment of foreign investment.  
For example, China has long rejected the pre-establishment national 
treatment provision in BITs, because as a result China must liberalize its 
domestic capital markets so that foreign investment can flow in and out 
freely.150  In response, some scholars advocated the four-safety-valve 
theory to protect China’s state interests: (i) the right of the host state to 
consent to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal on a case-by-case 
basis, (ii) the requirement that an investor exhaust local remedies before 
resorting to international arbitration, (iii) application of the host state's laws 
by the investment tribunal, and (iv) exceptions to BITs for essential 
national security interests.151  
Another factor that is important for China’s state interests lies in the 
enormous amount of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  In an ICSID case 
brought by the Beijing Urban Construction Group (BUCG) against the 
government of Yemen, Yemen challenged the BUCG’s function as an 
agent for the Chinese government and that it therefore did not qualify to 
use the ICSID Convention as a dispute settlement forum.152  The tribunal 
found that the assertion that the Chinese government is the decision maker 
for BUCG was too remote, and therefore concluded that BUCG was not 
performing a government function as an agent for the Chinese 
government.153  This case indicated the potential challenges for SOEs and 
corporations that are largely backed by the Chinese government, but also 
provides that the ICSID will still be available for disputes arising between 
Chinese SOEs and the foreign host states.154 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
Chinese investors are relatively new to the international arbitration 
procedures and foreign laws.  They might be unfamiliar with layers of 
regulatory compliance with the EU and the European host state, or find 
themselves to be the victims of drastic political regime shifts.  The 
inconsistent readings by the arbitral tribunals also severely burden 
 
 150. Supra note 125. 
 151. X. Han, On The Application Of The Principle Of Proportionality In Icsid 
Arbitration And Proposals To Government Of The People’s Republic Of China, [2006] 
JCULawRw 11; (2006) 13 JAMES COOK UNIV. L. REV. 233, http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/ 
journals/JCULawRw/2006/11.html#fnB36. 
 152. Beijing Urban Const. Grp. Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/30, Decision on Jurisdiction, 7, ¶ 29 (May 31, 2017). 
 153. Id. ¶ 43. 
 154. Supra note 92. 
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investors.  ISDS has been widely criticized, yet both the EU-China BIT and 
U.S.-China BIT are likely to keep this clause, at least in the current status 
of negotiation rounds.  As China reforms and expands its state policy to 
encourage both outbound and inbound investments, we expect to see a 
more cohesive ISDS clause that balances the interests between investors 
and states.  
Generally, courts, and especially arbitral tribunals, respect party 
autonomy when interpreting dispute settlement clauses.  While keeping in 
mind all those potential hurdles in foreign investments, the more proactive 
method for China is to minimize the risks during the course of contracting.  
Therefore, China’s focus during constructing dispute settlement clauses 
should focus on minimizing inconsistency and enhancing transparency, 
while taking into consideration maintaining a balance between the state’s 
interest and the investor’s interest.  This highlights a coherent ISDS system 
that can respond to the development of relevant treaties, the changes in 
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